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Abstract
This article addresses the heuristic utility of Karl Mannheim’s concept of generation to grasp 
wider processes of social and generational change. By proposing that there is a theoretical 
need to move from a strictly political or intellectual to an enlarged social understanding of 
generations, we shall deal with four key issues in Mannheim’s theory. Firstly, we address the 
understanding of time underpinning not only Mannheim’s concept of generations, but also his 
whole conceptualization of the relationship between knowledge and history. Secondly, we 
discuss  his  view  of  agency  as  a  volitional  self-awareness  that  underlies  his  concept  of 
generation-units, which is rather too narrow to account for wider and effective generational 
differences. Thirdly, we critically concentrate on the importance Mannheim gave to youth as 
the only type of agents that can produce a new worldview and organize it into ideological 
units  that  form  an  intelligentzia.  Finally,  the  question  of  consciousness  as  it  relates  to 
Mannheim’s vision of agency is also debated. With this reappraisal we propose an enlarged 
conception  of  generations  that  have  different  levels  of  structuration  thereby  countering 
Mannheim’s  emphasis  on  political  and  intellectual  self-awareness  as  a  pre-condition  for 
generation formation and change in a particular field. We apply this idea to the whole of the 
social space,  even though different institutional spheres may produce diverse generational 
differentiations.  We do so on the basis  that historical dynamics will  always translate into 
1
generational actualities, and that these are carried forward by active social agents within their 
respective structural constraints.
Introduction
The  subject  of  our  article  is  to  address  the  heuristic  utility  of  Karl  Mannheim’s 
classical concept of generation in order to grasp processes of social change, particularly the 
massive transformations that  have occurred with regard to  agency and identity  under  the 
structural  conditions  of  modernity  (e.g.  Burkitt  1990,  Giddens  1991,  Beck  and  Beck-
Gernsheim 2002).  Hence,  the  much  debated  ‘problem of  generations’,  as  formulated  by 
Mannheim ([1927] 1952) in his landmark essay, is at the core of our critical reappraisal. But 
rather than just proposing a revision, we aim to clarify certain theoretical alternatives that 
may help to promote a constructive perspective of the generation problem.
As Alwin and McCammon (2003, p. 24) wrote: ‘The idea of distinctive generations is 
(…) a complex one whose existence and effects are not easily documented’. In fact, as we 
will seek to ascertain, the issue of social change, at least over a significant stretch of time, 
necessarily implies an approach to the problem of generations. This is so whether we are 
speaking of historical and cultural generations (Mannheim [1927] 1952), which, as we will 
see, imply a degree of shared collective subjectivity often consciously perceived, or mere 
birth cohorts (Ryder 1965, Spitzer 1973, Kertzer 1983), which entail a common historical 
location  and  experience  but  not  necessarily  self-conscious  agency,  or,  again,  even 
genealogical  generations  in  a  line  of  family  descent,  which  relate  to  the  unavoidable 
constraints of biological succession, over time, within kinship systems.
In fact, the idea of generational difference has become widely used to document social 
change from different  perspectives,  though always involving a  close  connection  between 
history  and  the  ways  in  which  people  live  their  lives.1 However,  although  Mannheim’s 
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generations  have  been  indispensable  tools  for  discussing  social  change,  from  political 
revolutions to overall life style transformations, his theoretical contribution was used in a 
number of cases in a more far-reaching sense than originally encompassed.2 As we will see, it 
should not be forgotten that Mannheim’s main concern was essentially with ideological and 
political change, rather than overall societal and cultural shifts (or the reduction of the latter 
to  the  former).  For  this  reason,  we  consider  that  there  is  still  a  gap  to  be  bridged  in 
generational analysis.
By proposing that  there  is  a  theoretical  need to  move from a  strictly  political  or 
intellectual  (as  favored  in  Mannheim’s  work)  to  an  enlarged  social  understanding  of 
generations,  we aim to  tie  together  two crucial  elements  in  the  comprehension of  social 
change.  On the one hand, it  is  of the utmost  importance to  continue to  reflect  upon the 
potential and the limits of the concept of ‘generation’ as a theoretical tool, which, in spite of 
its complexity and polymorphic and even confusing uses and meanings in the field, might 
account for social transformations, as it intrinsically refers to the succession of individuals 
over time. On the other hand, a conceptualization of social generations implies considering a 
plethora  of  practices  and  dispositions,  far  beyond  the  limited  struggles  for  political  and 
ideological power waged by engaged minorities. As a result, to grasp such a huge array of 
generational practices and dispositions, it is necessary to bring in the complex connections 
between structure and agency.
In our view, the approach to generations remains problematic for three main reasons. 
The first difficulty reflects a number of theoretical issues, particularly the confused meanings 
that are inherent to the concept itself, which often raise serious doubts about the heuristic 
potential of generational analysis to grasp social change. The immediate question that comes 
to  mind  is,  ‘What  are  we  really  talking  about  when  speaking  of  generations?’ From 
Mannheim’s perspective, a generation only arises when new answers to massive disruptions 
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are put forward by an engaged group or several, even opposing, groups. When these new 
formative principles do not materialize, even in the presence of social change, a generation is 
not  a  real  generation  but  rather  a  mere  birth  cohort  obeying the  principles  of  biological 
reproduction. As we shall discuss later, this leads not only to a narrow vision of generations 
and generational change in a society, but also to a theoretical dead-end.
The second concern is related to the ways in which the links between history and 
individuals may be reconstructed. On the one hand, Mannheim’s approach fails to consider 
generational change as a globally constructed process unless people are sucked into massive, 
observable  social  disruption.  However,  this  is  hardly  the  case  for  most  of  the  historical 
situations and events, even ‘revolutions’, that have occurred, and even less so if we speak of 
extended and hidden structural processes (e.g. Braudel 1958). Furthermore, even if people are 
united by the sense of a common destiny, this presupposes, in Mannheim’s view, a higher 
level of consciousness by a small part of those people, particularly those engaged in political 
and  ideological  movements.  As  such,  when  they  exist,  Mannheim’s  generations  are 
essentially small  generational groups existing within the struggles of specific institutional 
settings such as politics or the arts. How can we go beyond these political generations and 
discover the real generational differences that cut across a whole population, that is to say, 
social  generations,  without  making  the  latter  mere  passive  recipients  of  historical 
determinations, or birth cohorts? On the other hand, more recently, a number of authors have 
written about other forms of generational unity (see note 2), such as those immanent in folk 
and pop culture.  Problematically,  they enlarge the scope of Mannheim’s perspective well 
beyond his theoretical program.
Finally, a third problem challenges the concept’s own capacity to give an account of 
increasingly complex forms of differentiation. Can we really speak of clear-cut generational 
differences in today’s societies? Our emphasis on the need to enlarge the theoretical reach of 
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the concept precisely reflects our preoccupation with making use of such a perspective in 
increasingly  individualized  societies  (e.g.  Elias  [1939–1987]  1991,  Beck  and  Beck-
Gernsheim 2002),  where the pluralization of individuals’ lives and identities is  more and 
more  an  issue  to  be  addressed.3 In  fact,  it  is  impossible  to  tackle  these  historical 
transformations without making use of the idea of generational change or, on the other hand, 
without exploring the connections between age identity (as a relative position regarding other 
age groups and, also, in recollection of one’s ‘formative years’) and the development of a 
potential generational consciousness (Schuman and Scott 1989, Hepworth 2002). Indeed, the 
concept  of  the  sharing  of  a  common  cultural  subjectivity  as  a  condition  for  generation 
formation and intergenerational change contains much of the appeal of Mannheim’s proposal, 
as generations become more than descriptive elements of history, mere passive categories, 
and,  instead,  are  built  upon  and  become  the  protagonists  of  historical  change  itself. 
Nevertheless,  Mannheim’s understanding of a cultural  consciousness has also provoked a 
number of well-formulated criticisms that counter this vision of human agency as the basis 
for the emergence of generational change. In a way, it has been almost impossible to speak of 
Mannheim’s  generations  without  also  putting  forward  a  particular  conceptualization  that 
reproduces the endless structure/agency dichotomy, with an emphasis on one or the other.
In sum, the concept of generation is – with a certain revision of Mannheim – central 
both to our thinking of historical time and change and the placing of individuals and their  
agency in those times and processes of social change. And if generations of individuals are 
not to be understood as mere passive agents of social transformations, we must consider that 
their actions and symbolic perceptions do matter, and not just the illuminated consciousness 
of some (un)happy few. As a result, we need a concept of generations that allows us to think 
of processes of social change that are not restricted to these small and politically motivated 
groups (or units, to use Mannheim’s somewhat militaristic and militant terminology) but are 
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more representative of the whole of a society – a concept that can explain how a group of 
cohorts, as defined by Ryder (1965) or Kertzer (1982, 1983), even if with fuzzy borders, is in  
fact a social generation with a cultural content.
Though important, the simple sharing of the same historical experiences by a birth 
cohort may not be enough to explain, or even describe, complex processes of generational 
differentiation. Moreover, we do not follow Mannheim’s reasoning on the constitution of self-
conscious generations, even if we do agree that shared collective subjectivities (Domingues 
1995) must  be incorporated into  the  analysis  if  we wish to  further  our  understanding of 
change. But it would be a misnomer to call them either cohorts or self-conscious generations, 
as Mannheim proposed, inspired by Marx’s view of a ‘class for itself’. In either case, the risk 
of  falling  into  simplistic  dichotomies  that  tend  to  reify  the  concept  of  generation  is  of 
paramount importance.  Even if  we avoid a definition of generation as a necessarily self-
conscious project, we still focus on generational differences as culturally based differences 
that involve agency and embodiment (e.g. Eyerman and Turner 1998) as well as memory and 
discourse (e.g. Corsten 1999), rather than on simple cohort differences, thus hoping to avoid a 
common problem in a number of analyses (e.g. Alwin and McCammon 2003, p. 28).
1. The challenge of generational analysis
‘Generation’ is a notion often used in the social sciences and everyday language alike 
to  locate  an  individual  or  group  of  individuals  at  a  point  both  in  historical  time  and 
genealogical succession. However, the concept of ‘generation’, particularly in its historical 
assertion as conceptualized by the social sciences, only began to be developed in the first half  
of the twentieth century (Howe and Strauss 2000). So it is impossible to speak of generations 
and intergenerational differences without referencing them primarily to time (e.g. Eyerman 
and Turner 1998, Edmunds and Turner 2002a and 2002b). However, the conceptualization of 
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time has been a complex endeavor due to its complexity and multidimensional character, 
which has often set naturalistic and historicist conceptions in opposition (e.g. Pomian 1984, 
Adam 1990).4 In the first view, generations just succeed each other in a genealogy, primarily 
as  the  result  of  biological  constraints.  Conversely,  in  the  second  view,  as  developed  by 
Mannheim, a generation is essentially a historical construct that transcends the biological 
chronology of life from birth to death.
Indeed, the concern with time and, inherently, with the succession of generations over 
time has left its mark on sociological thinking, and has done so since the very beginning. It  
has reflected the main preoccupation with social change under the conditions of modernity, a 
preoccupation  that  was  indelibly  present  in  the  approaches  of  classical  authors  such  as 
(among many others)5 Comte and Durkheim, on the one hand, and Dilthey and Weber, on the 
other. Countering the positivist view of time as an external and natural force, the vision of 
generations as social constructs can, in effect, be found in a number of theoretical approaches
6 besides that of Mannheim, even if its use is sometimes unclear and polemic and has given 
way to  the  more  operative  concept  of  birth  cohort  (Ryder  1965,  Kertzer  1983).  From a 
different  theoretical  perspective,  Eisenstadt’s  functionalist  approach  to  generations  in  his 
classic From Generation to Generation (Eisenstadt 1956) is still today a preeminent analysis 
of how generations are built differently in traditional and modern societies and how youth 
cultures,  as symbols of intergenerational change and even rebellion,  have emerged in the 
latter.7 In fact, as Eyerman and Turner (1998) point out, the concept of generation has been 
routinely and profusely used in the study of youth cultures.
Nonetheless,  the  analytical  ground  for  studying  generations  and  intergenerational 
change  in  contemporary  sociological  theorization  remains  a  poorly  developed  domain 
(Pilcher 1994, Eyerman and Turner 1998,  Edmunds and Turner 2005), in spite of the 
groundbreaking  advances  made  in  the  last  few decades.  These  have  sought  to  articulate 
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historical time and individual life in more complex manners, in an attempt to overcome the 
reductionism  of  the  cohort  concept  and  thus  bring  culture  back  into  the  analysis  (e.g. 
Edmunds and Turner 2005). Another important development can be found, for instance, in 
life course theories (Elder, Johnson and Crosnoe 2003). They have sought, on the one hand, 
to overturn the old conceptions of an organized and linear life cycle, which allegedly imposed 
prefabricated and rather immobile roles upon individuals, and, on the other, have attempted to 
assess  the  impact  of  historical  change on the  majority  of  individuals  in  a  given society. 
Furthermore, as Edmunds and Turner (2003) claim, given the relative erosion of a strong 
class theory, there has been a recent increase in sociologists’ interest in generations as a key 
aspect in the examination of social stratification processes other than social class. The truth is  
that the concept of generation, whether it refers to a birth cohort, a genealogical position in a 
family lineage or a self-conscious cultural or political movement, is everything but simple or 
even  consensual,  perhaps  because  it  embraces  a  wide  range  of  meanings  and  angles  of 
analysis (e.g. Corsten 1999). Undoubtedly, the conceptualization of age and time has been the 
object of a myriad of theoretical approaches, which have often highlighted the complex and 
hazy character of the so commonly used term ‘generation’ (e.g. Adam 1990, Pilcher 1994).
The difficulties surrounding the concept increase even further when the analysis is not 
centered on birth cohorts and their succession over time but rather historical generations in 
the sense Mannheim gave the term (Alwin and McCammon 2003 and 2007).  As Pilcher 
(1994) also notes, Mannheim’s contribution represents an undervalued and often disregarded 
legacy, though his approach, unlike the highly operative cohort approach (see below), poses 
the problem of not having an empirical model or guidelines that could help us deal with 
generations in real settings (Pilcher 1994, p. 492). That is, at least, with regard to generational 
change outside the particular fields of political and ideological struggle, to which Mannheim 
gave primacy when dealing with the problem of generations (e.g. Kettler, Loader and Meja 
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2008). To a great extent, the limitations of Mannheim’s conceptualization of time, built upon 
Dilthey’s ([1910] 2010) notion of an internal time which ought to supersede the notion of 
time  as  an  external  force  to  human  agency,  derive,  as  we  will  argue,  from  his  own 
conceptualization  of  generations  in  the  context  of  his  sociological  edifice,  in  which  the 
exercise of tying together locations and structures of knowledge was center-stage (Kettler et 
al.  2008). The  concept  of  a  worldview (Weltanschauung),  which Mannheim  also 
borrowed from Dilthey, is a cornerstone insofar as it identifies a ‘sense of life’, which, though 
common to a given epoch, may be distinct in different cultural  fields such as the arts  or 
politics.8 The latter was Mannheim’s own object of research as shown by his empirical study 
on  generations  and  conservatism (Mannheim [1925]  1986).  Influenced  by  Max  Weber’s 
([1924] 1946) analysis of social stratification in terms of class, status and party, Mannheim 
showed that conservatism was the characteristic of a social class in decline, in opposition to 
the rise of the modern industrial capitalist project. The same logic applies to generations and 
intergenerational  change  (Edmunds  and  Turner  2002a).  Mainly  interested  in  connecting 
worldviews with historical locations, of which a generation is a prime example other than 
class,  Mannheim  guided  himself  to  what  he  calls  the  ‘structural  analyses’ of  cultural 
phenomena. 
Mannheim’s  oeuvre  reveals,  in  fact,  an  acute  awareness  of  the  progressive 
fragmentation  of  time.  His  recognition  of  pluralized  time  led  him  to  conceptualize  the 
existence of multiple time-space continuums, rather than cultural homogeneity. In specific 
historical  contexts,  time  and  space  are  inseparable,  and  only  through  such  an  insightful 
coupling could a true account be given of cultural differentiation (Kettler et al. 2008, p. 24). 
For  him,  a  sociological  approach  to  time  should  conceive  it  as  dynamical  and  even 
hierarchical,  as  opposed  to  the  positivist  chronological  view.  Indeed,  for  Mannheim, 
intergenerational  change,  that  is,  the  relations  between  past  and  present,  can  only  be 
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understood if  mediated  by the  structures  of  meaning through which  the  interpretation  of 
historical conditions and events generates a differential in the amount and velocity of change. 
In  other  words,  there  are  always  plural  sites  of  experience,  which  bring  about  different 
worldviews,  even  if  these  views  are  more  related  to  space-time  locations  than  to  the 
embodied  experience  and agency of  individuals.  Individual  experience  was,  for  instance, 
more important in Georg Simmel’s theorization of the conditions of modernity, as he so well 
argued  in  his  theory  of  social  circles  (Simmel  [1908]  1989).  Nonetheless,  Mannheim’s 
theorization makes a few important  advances in  conceptualizing the relationship between 
location and culture. He seeks to avoid the trap of reification. In this line of reasoning, one 
very  important  aspect  of  his  theory  of  generations  is  indebted to  Pinder’s  ([1926] 1961) 
principle  of  the ‘non-contemporaneity  of  the  contemporaneous’, as ‘the epitome of 
objections to conceptions of history as a succession of self-contained and uniform “spirits of 
the age” (Zeitgeiste)’ (Kettler et al. 2008, p. 24). Notwithstanding, Mannheim’s attempt at not 
reifying generational worldviews is mitigated to a certain extent by his notion of ‘entelechy’ 
(Entelechie),  or  ‘creatively  willed  generational  worldviews’ (Kettler et  al.,  2008,  p.  24), 
which we shall discuss further in the coming sections.
In sum, if we really want to examine the heuristic capacity of generational analysis 
with regard to its potential to explain different patterns of attitudes and practices beyond the 
mere  description  of  macro-social  change  or  the  organization  of  ideological  and  political 
struggles, we must overcome a volitional conceptualization of generational identity.
In  the  section  that  follows,  we  will  briefly  describe  Mannheim’s  concept  of 
‘generation’.
2. Mannheim’s sociological problem of generations
10
As already hinted, the enormous complexity of generations was well recognized by 
Mannheim insofar as, from the outset in his approach to the problem, there was a clear-cut 
division of the concept into a number of different definitions that might be mobilized for 
generational analysis. In this way, Mannheim endowed us with a tripartite presentation of a 
generation.
First of all, a generation is a location (Generationslagerung) in the historical process. 
As he wrote (Mannheim [1927] 1952, p. 290), ‘... the unity of a generation is constituted 
essentially  by a similarity  of location of a  number of individuals within a social  whole.’ 
Though the location is partially based on the biological factors of life, from birth to death, it 
is not, in any way, reducible to a linear biological succession but rather implies a positioning 
in history. The notion of location shares a degree of similarity with that of a birth cohort – 
though this is usually more of an objectivist notion where time is external – but, in itself, it is 
clearly  insufficient  to  fully  grasp  the  notion  of  a  social  generation.  Consequently,  as 
Mannheim ([1927] 1952, p. 291) clearly claimed: ‘... belonging to the same generation or age 
group (...) endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and 
historical  process,  and  thereby  limits  them  to  a  specific  range  of  potential  experience, 
predisposing  them  for  a  certain  characteristic  mode  of  thought  and  experience,  and  a 
characteristic type of historical relevant action.’ However, a location is not merely defined by 
time, but by time and space, as mentioned above. In this sense, the Germans and Chinese 
born  in  the  same year  do  not  share  the  same location.  Moreover,  German  peasants  and 
German  urban  intellectuals  do  not  share  the  same  location,  either.  Time  is  therefore 
necessarily filtered by space.
But  more  than  a  location,  a  generation  is  also  an  actuality 
(Generationszusammenhang), which shares an integrated combination of historical responses 
to  its  location.  So the location,  and the historical  conditions  associated with it,  in which 
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individuals are socialized, functions as a structure of opportunities which might be translated 
into a real generation, an actuality sharing a similar ‘mental order’, that is to say, a common 
culture. Without the formation of a generational awareness or consciousness, a generational 
location represents no more than a passive category, from which no break with the past or  
novel forms of knowledge and action can emerge. The mere exposure to the same historical 
context,  in  Mannheim’s  terms ‘die  Generationslagerung’,  is  not  enough to characterize a 
generation. Quoting Mannheim ([1927] 1952, p. 303) once more, it is clear that a generation 
as  an  actuality  emerges  ‘only  where  a  concrete  bond  is  created  between  members  of  a 
generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of 
dynamic  de-stabilization’.  Only  then  can  people,  particularly  the  emerging  younger 
generation, share a common entelechy, a term borrowed from Pinder ([1926] 1961), which 
Mannheim  now  gives  a  particular  ground  of  analysis.  When  Mannheim  wrote  about 
generations, emphasizing the role of youth, he was well aware of the angst faced by German 
youth in the wake of World War I, not only in response to trench warfare but also the poverty 
and shame associated with the German defeat.
Finally, within an actual generation there are generation units (Generationseinheiten), 
which  express  their  particular  location  through  articulated  structures  of  knowledge  and 
explicit consciousness. A generation unit self-consciously mobilizes that shared culture for 
social  and  political  action.  But,  rather  than  being  homogeneous,  a  particular  generation 
contains a number of diverse units, notably those exemplified by political parties in conflict 
and articulated in competing ideologies. The ideological field, as Mannheim conceives it, is 
plural insofar as different worldviews can be developed as a response to the same historical 
settings.  However,  these  different  and even antagonistic  units  share  the  same time-space 
location, in that their different worldviews are oriented towards each other. They can only be 
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decoded to the  extent  that  they belong to each other  and are representative  of  the same 
generational Zeitgeist.
Mannheim’s tripartite definition of generation – as  location,  actuality and  unit(s) –  
still  provides  the  elementary  conceptual  tools  to  approach  the  problem  from  a 
multidimensional perspective. Indeed, rather than reifying age-groups as concrete groups or 
automatically generated cultural units stemming from structural conditions, only because they 
are members of the same cohort (Corsten 1999), Mannheim calls our attention to the complex 
processes that transform a generation as a historical location into a real generation that shares 
a  common destiny and structure of knowledge.  Moreover,  he enables us to dismember a 
specific generation into diverse and even antagonistic generation-units, which may represent 
different  subjective  and  reflexively  organized  political  reactions  to  the  same  historical 
conditions and events. As he states (Mannheim [1927] 1952, p. 306), ‘Within this community 
of people with a common destiny there can then arise particular generation-units. These are 
characterized by the fact that they do not merely involve a loose participation by a number of 
individuals  in  a  pattern  of  events  shared  by all  alike  though interpreted  by  the  different 
individuals differently, but an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all  
move with and are formed by their common experiences.’
In sum, a generation that is able to fulfill its potential for social change must integrate 
at least one or, most often, several generation-units, each one representing a particular but 
somehow  interconnected  vision  of  the  generational  Zeitgeist.  In  this  train  of  thought, 
generational units may become concrete groups, for instance, the 1968 student movement, to 
mention a brief but illustrative example (Kriegel 1978). In this case, individuals were united 
not only by structural historical commonalities (a location), but by a common culture and 
worldview (an actuality), which impelled them to engage collectively in transforming agency, 
as a unit opposed to others.
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However, though representing a theoretical challenge by itself, the comprehension of 
Mannheim’s approach to the ‘problem of generations’ remains limited if it is not linked to his 
wider  sociological  project,  which  he  developed  in  a  particular  historical  and  intellectual 
environment in which he personally suffered the influence of world-shaking historical events 
(Wolff 1971). Mannheim’s biography, one of intellectual and geographical migration, reflects 
the disruptions and crises of the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, falling into three 
main phases: the Hungarian (until 1919), the German (1919-1933), and the British (1933-
1947). In a certain way, each period represents a complex weaving of historical events and 
innumerable  intellectual  influences.9 From his  entry  to  academia,  under  the  influence  of 
Georg  Simmel  and György Lukács,  to  his  German period,  when he  worked with  Alfred 
Weber (brother of Max Weber, who was also a major influence on him), and finally to the 
forced exile to Britain in 1933, to escape the rise of National Socialism, his writings reflect 
different sources of inspiration (in particular, German historicism, Marxism, phenomenology 
and  Anglo-American  pragmatism),  though  he  maintained  a  degree  of  coherence  and 
commitment to his intellectual project. Investigation into the roots of culture was, in short,  
the core of his own intellectual project, which was directed from an early stage towards a 
sociology of  knowledge.  In  what  is  perhaps  his  most  famous  contribution,  Ideology and 
Utopia, he contended that the term ideology ought to be reformulated and broadened in order 
to give account of the complexity of the structures of knowledge (Mannheim [1929] 1936). In 
fact, ‘The problem of generations’, which constitutes our main object of analysis, was written 
in 1927 in Weimar Germany, two years before the publication of  Ideology and Utopia. As 
Mannheim had, at  this  time,  already lived through numerous hiatus events – such as the 
Russian Revolution and WWI – that created their own generational conflicts, it is not strange 
that he took an interest in the problem of generations.  In fact, from the beginning of his 
intellectual itinerary, he was particularly concerned with the social processes that underlie 
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knowledge production,  one of which is  related to generations.  However,  competition and 
economic ambition were not ignored by Mannheim, as became quite clear in  Ideology and 
Utopia (Wolff  1971).  Above all,  he  was concerned with  the  interpretation  of  intellectual 
phenomena (Interpretation der  geistigen Gebilde),  and along the road this  marked all  his 
writings as the main problem.
Mannheim’s  approach  to  generations,  however,  synthesizes  key  elements  of  his 
thought.  In  fact,  his  analysis  of  generations  is  central  to  the  discussion  of  different 
conceptions of time, focusing directly on the split between objective and subjective as well as 
unitary and plural conceptualizations of the  Zeitgeist. However, these opposing visions of 
historical time are also center-stage in his understanding of culture and ideology as linked to 
consciousness, which we will discuss further on. Nonetheless, describing his approach to the 
problem of generations without also considering his major intellectual battles, namely with 
Marx and Marxism, would be misleading. Particularly, as we will argue, because many of his 
theoretical shortcomings derive from his relative inability to effectively go beyond the terms 
of the debate imposed by Marx and his followers (such as Lukács [1920] 1968). Indeed, his 
view of generations can be interpreted as a criticism of Marxism, which he 
considered extremely deterministic,  as  Edmunds and Turner (2002b,  p.  4) 
note.  Mannheim was interested in the role of generations as agents of 
social  change,  who  were  not  linearly  determined  by  the  economic 
structures of  society.  However,  though granting an autonomous role  to 
culture – a role that Gramsci ([1947] 1979), for instance, would develop later – 
Mannheim never fully escapes the Marxist worldview, even if he replaces 
economics with culture and social classes with generations.
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Such a definition of generations poses several problems, which we will address in the 
next section. As we will claim, many of these problems are indissociable from Mannheim’s 
conception of ideology (e.g. Freeden 2003).
3. The problems with Mannheim’s problem of generations
Mannheim’s theory of generations raises a number of critical issues that can best be 
dealt with in four parts. The first relates to the understanding of time underpinning not only 
his concept of generations, but also his whole conceptualization of the relationship between 
knowledge and history. Mannheim’s understanding of time, while trying to resolve previous 
discussions that radically contrasted an externalist and objectivist view with an internalist and 
subjectivist one, produced a paradoxical duality in his causal explanation of the emergence of 
generations. Moreover, at the same time, it promoted volitional agency as the decisive and 
creative factor of true generations, and, in so doing, gave final preponderance to internal time. 
The second problem in Mannheim resides precisely in his view of agency. If agency is, in the 
final  analysis,  a  volitional  self-awareness,  then all  forms of  agency other  than conscious 
intellectuality are excluded, particularly since Mannheim considers ideological struggles as 
the  main  arena  for  generational  differentiation.  This  is  the  rationale  for  his  concept  of 
generation-units  (small,  organized,  ideological  and  engaged  groups)  as  the  only  true 
generations – a concept that is rather too narrow and limited, we argue, to account for wider 
and effective generational differences. The third problem relates to his conception of the only 
type of agents that can, then, produce a new generational worldview – the youth, organized 
into ideological units. The fourth and final issue is the important question of consciousness. 
The centrality given to internal time, which provokes an intellectualist characterization of 
innovative agency,  even if  triggered by external  factors  that  awake a  free consciousness, 
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steers Mannheim into a self-aware view of generations (more precisely, generation-units), 
and the exaltation of the intelligentzia.
3.1. The problem of time
Various concepts have been developed to deal with the succession of individuals over 
time.  In  fact,  one  of  the  main  sources  of  confusion  in  generational  analysis  is  the 
interchangeability,  even  conflation,  with  which  these  different  concepts  are  used  in  the 
analysis of social change.
At least four distinct meanings need to be advanced (e.g. Kertzer 1983, p. 126). In the 
first  place,  a  generation  denotes  a  position  in  a  family  lineage,  thereby  referring  to  the 
biological rhythm of generational succession in a line of kinship descent. A second way of 
viewing generations is through a life-stage perspective linked to age-groups, which differs 
from the word’s usage as a concept related with historical change. As Kertzer (1983, p. 127) 
exemplifies, ‘In its life-stage usage, we find such expressions as the “college generation”’. A 
third meaning is, of course, related to historical locations, or generations as birth cohorts. 
Finally, following Mannheim, a generation also involves a degree of historical participation 
guided  by  self-awareness,  or  at  least  some  sort  of  collective  cultural  subjectivity  (e.g. 
Domingues 1995). As Alwin and McCammon (2007) note, all these notions have been found 
useful.  In fact,  even though Kertzer  (1983, p.  143) advises  that  these different  meanings 
should be distinguished as they refer to specific processes, he recognizes that generational 
phenomena, taken as a whole, articulate these different levels. A number of authors have, 
indeed, realized that dealing with generations brings different layers of internal and external 
time into play. However, even if this is the case, the fact is that reconciliation is difficult and 
often leads to precedence being given to one term over another.
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These difficulties are clearly evident in Ortega y Gasset’s  (1933) proposal.  As the 
author says, ‘If the essence of each generation is a particular type of sensibility, an organic 
capacity for certain deeply-rooted directions of thought, this means that each generation has 
its special vocation, its historical mission. It is under the strictest compulsion to develop those 
tiny seeds and to give the existence of its environment a form corresponding to the pattern of 
its own spontaneity’ (Ortega y Gasset 1933, p. 19). Similarly to Mannheim, Ortega initially 
defines a real generation by its internal time, although, rather than narrowing this ‘sensibility’ 
to  particular  groups or  units,  generations  are  granted  a  more  transversal  social  character. 
However, at another point, Ortega seeks to make this notion more operative and ultimately 
falls into a rather arbitrary definition of age-groups: it  conveys a linear vision of the life 
cycle,  where  agency  is  particularly  linked  to  political  participation  and  intergenerational 
conflict, only occurring in certain periods of individuals’ lives (namely from the age of 30 to 
45).  This  arbitrariness was strongly criticized by Ortega’s  disciple,  Julián Marías  ([1949] 
1970), who went back to his first insight of generations as a social construction, and, without 
completely abandoning Ortega’s age-groups, stressed the central role of a kind of reflexive 
clairvoyance, played by a small group of individuals, or even just one individual, in grasping 
and  living  the  Zeitgeist (Spitzer  1973,  p.  1357).  In  a  way,  returning  to  Hegel  and  his 
conceptualization of the role of the hero, the one who seizes the convolutions of the spirit 
beforehand.
Notwithstanding  the  complex  interactions  between  these  levels  of  analysis,  our 
discussion is focused on the concept of social generation, and not on genealogical succession 
or age-groups. In this line of reasoning, the main difference is, of course, between a cohort 
concept and a generation concept, each of which convokes a different perspective of time 
and,  as  such,  of  the criteria  used to demarcate  the boundaries of these human groups or 
categories.  Mannheim’s  response,  finally,  was  to  somehow accentuate  the  importance  of 
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internal time, which was in fact the main reason for his making units the real generation. In a 
way, we can consider this a subjectivist, though not individualistic, solution, even if structural 
locations  cannot  be dismissed as also being a key part  of the equation.  However,  unlike 
Marx’s  structural  definition  of  class,  generational  self-awareness  is  not  a  matter  of  de-
alienation and the realization of a predetermined historical, objectivist and unitary destiny, 
but a creative response resulting in multiple meanings (or ideological positions) in the face of 
the same destabilized structural conditions. Given the problems arising from such a stance, in 
particular the leap into an almost clairvoyant self-awareness, which was a pre-condition for a 
generation to exist,  others have tried to go back to a more objectivist notion, such as the 
concept of a cohort.
This  concept  was  presented  as  a  way  out  for  the  theoretical  difficulties  with 
Mannheim’s notion of generation, especially considering the problem of establishing limits 
between  different  generations,  which  can  be  rather  fuzzy.  However,  it  does  not  help  us 
understand more complex social processes. The main problem with the cohort approach is 
that the simple acknowledgment of cohort effects does not automatically imply the existence 
of social generations as a historical and cultural construct. As White (1992) stressed, cohorts 
should only be interpreted as generations when they subjectively show enough coherence and 
can therefore become actors in their own time. Likewise, as Cavalli (2004, p. 159) notes, ‘It 
is impossible to establish a priori how long a generation is going to last or how many cohorts 
it  includes.’ This  results  from  the  fact  that  generations,  in  Mannheim’s  perspective,  are 
always the consequence of major historical discontinuities whose rhythm and sequence can 
be quite variable. In short, as Alwin and McCammon (2003, p. 41) point out, ‘Unlike cohorts, 
Generations do not enjoy a fixed metric that easily lends itself to statistical analysis’, and, as 
a  result,  intergenerational  differences  are  not  only  more  qualitative  (a  specific  historical 
subjectivity) than quantitative (being born on a given date), but also their frontiers are not 
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identifiable outside a specific context or a specific analytical perspective. Generations depend 
upon and vary according to  the  particular  realm of  social  reality  being  examined,  while 
‘cohorts’ can easily be applied to almost any of the different social contexts, albeit at the risk 
of the de-contextualization of social phenomena.
Though critical of cohort approaches, we by no means claim that the cohort concept is 
useless. On the contrary, a cohort approach can be quite effective when the research problem 
involves, for example, comparing the same age-groups in different social locations or over a 
certain time span, though, from this perspective, the comparison is really between different 
contexts rather than different generations. The comparison between cohorts is also a more 
descriptive  task,  while  the  concept  of  generation  can  serve  better  to  capture,  and  even 
explain, social change in a given social context since, contrary to cohorts, generations are 
built upon social change itself.
Another important critical point regarding cohorts relates to their apparently greater 
objectivity compared to the blurriness of generations – at least at the edges, even if the center  
may be clearer (Rosow 1978) – when it comes to distinguishing the marking events that are 
relevant from those that are not. However, a thorough examination of the conceptualization of 
a cohort may suggest a different interpretation. If, as Ryder (1965, p. 845) states, ‘a cohort 
may be defined as the aggregate of individuals who experienced the same event within the 
same time interval’, then any event may create a cohort. As a result, three main problems 
arise with this approach. On the one hand, we may question the accuracy of the criteria for 
taking, for example, birth years as the units for defining a given cohort. Why not use decades 
or even a specific month of a given year instead? On the other hand, cohorts can be devised 
on  the  basis  of  an  enormous  variety  of  events,  which  only  with  difficulty  would  be 
comparable (e.g. birth, marriage, migration, and so forth), and are not, in a number of cases, 
significantly linked to the flow of history. Finally, on yet another critical note, events other 
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than birth  may not usually  correspond to birth  cohorts,  but  rather  conflate  different  age-
groups – in  the  sense  of  those born at  the  same time – with  life  course  transitions:  for 
instance,  among those who marry in the same year some may be in their  twenties while 
others  are  already  in  their  seventies.  Accordingly,  we  can  argue  that  this  comfortable 
statistical objectivity is not as accurate as it may seem at first glance. Some authors (e.g. 
Tindale  and  Marshall  1980,  among  others)  have  tried  to  resolve  this  conundrum  by 
accentuating the historical basis of cohorts. Yet, when defined as historical, cohorts are as 
dependent  on  contextual  references  as  social  generations  are.  They  thus  raise  the  same 
comparative problems, in spite of their apparent objectivism, which tends to leave out the 
cultural dimension of generational commonalities. But these problems are also the underlying 
reason why other writers, such as Ryder (1965), advocate restricting the analysis to kinship 
and genealogical generations.
The potential fragmentation of generational analysis into a myriad of different age 
cohorts is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for not giving up the construction of a full 
generational perspective,  even if there are major difficulties in working with the concept. 
Among these problems, we must emphasize that, in giving an ascendant role to historical 
discontinuities in socio-cultural  change, we will  then have moments where no generation 
rises from its historical location, that is, if we can accept that no crucial events occur during a 
certain  time  span  and  continuity  prevails.  We  can,  however,  argue  that  continuity  and 
reproduction are substantial social phenomena made up of a plethora of significant events 
that have a lasting impact on peoples’ lives and worldviews. In this train of thought, we argue 
against the idea of an ‘invisible’ or ‘silent’ generation (Cavalli 2004, p. 159), if these concepts 
imply collective and individual subjects  that  are not  agents of social  relations,  but  rather 
passive  objects  of  an  unchanging  history,  deprived  of  reflexive  subjectivity.  In  brief, 
countering Mannheim, there cannot be an absence of generational phenomena in an enlarged 
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sociological perspective, because there is never an absence of social agency or agents, even if 
they are objectified and constrained to acquiesce. 
Whether  or  not  the  focus  is  on  discontinuity,  the  question  remains:  what  are  the 
criteria used not only to aggregate cohorts into an effective generational collective, but also to 
point  out  that  a  group  of  cohorts  is  a  real  generation  while  others  are  not.  Overall, 
Mannheim’s response is one of duality, even if, as we stressed above, he tries to emphasize 
the importance of internal time.
According  to  Mannheim,  generations  can  be  almost  sporadic  episodes  in  history, 
because they are dependent on massive social change. When there is stability, we only have 
cohorts.  Secondly,  these generational locations only become generational actualities when 
social change is massive enough to create a dichotomy in terms of consciousness. In fact, 
though  Mannheim attributes  less  relevance  to  external  time  than internal  time,  it  is  still 
external  factors  that  trigger  the  actual  possibility  of  participating  in  a  common  destiny. 
Through this, a sense of self-aware generational belonging emerges, which can then produce 
generation units. However, if we follow this rationale, we will be denying that consciousness 
is obviously possible in times of ‘stagnation’. Awareness driven by ideological and political 
agency is a phenomenon of a different type, even if massive disruption can engender rejection 
of what was, in favor of what may be.
The problem of time in Mannheim, given this duality and the fact that he ascribes 
final causality to internal time – insofar as external events must be filtered and creatively 
interpreted through consciousness – is that it leads to the construction of meaning, ideological 
reflexivity, by the only ones able, in his view, to bring about new responses to the world: 
youth units. So these become the only real active agents of social change inasmuch as they 
are conceptualized as potential units with new clear-cut political programs.
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3.2. The problem of agency
Mannheim’s duality in relation to time is well reflected in the use of the concept of 
generational unit(s), a position that, in our view, constitutes another major problem with his 
approach. As we will argue, even if this dimension of the concept of generation is sometimes 
useful (particularly in an analysis of political and organizational fields), it leads to a rather 
empty vision of generations and intergenerational change, in the great majority of cases. For 
two main reasons: it excludes almost everyone from agency and implies a degree of self-
awareness that surpasses the reflexivity and the structures of meaning of that majority. The 
inability, in Mannheim, to conceptualize agency in more complex ways is therefore closely 
connected with his vision of a real generation as generational units, always self-aware and 
ideologically engaged.
This leads to an important query: is the concept of units useful? In answering this 
question,  we  argue  that  we  must  consider  two  different  aspects,  insofar  as  generational 
analysis greatly depends on the object of inquiry. On the one hand, without doubt, generation 
units can be a very useful concept to account for intra-generational differences, particularly 
when  the  focus  is  on  the  political,  ideological,  and  artistic,  or  on  any  tangible  social 
groupings and movements. Adding to Mannheim’s own research, a number of authors (e.g. 
Braungart 1976, Dunham 1998) have proved the relative utility of the concept for analyzing 
more or less organized groups and social movements, which nonetheless always represent, 
we reemphasize, a minority of the population. On the other hand, a number of difficulties 
arise with this concept. An important argument lies precisely in the fact that this notion is too 
narrow to account for wider generational phenomena. If, in the end, a generation is a unit or 
several  units,  then  the  rest  represents  rather  an  empty  category.  A good example  of  this 
problem can be found in the study carried out by Whalen and Flacks (1989). The authors used 
Mannheim’s concept of generation to explore the extent to which members of the ‘sixties 
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generation’ identified  with  the  era  and  concluded  that  the  levels  of  identification  varied 
according to a number of factors. The truth is that not all members of the ‘sixties cohort’ (we 
use the term cohort  deliberately)  identified  with  the  ‘revolutionary’ political  and cultural 
icons of the decade. Quite the opposite, most people just carried on living their lives, even if 
these references were, to a greater or lesser extent, embodied as markers of the time. That is 
to say, if those who lived through the sixties form a certain actuality – in the sense that, in 
most cases, people are not unfamiliar with these markers, constructed a posteriori as icons of 
the  era  –  only  a  small  proportion  of  them had  committed  itself,  was  proactive  or  even 
explicitly defended the ideals of political,  sexual and artistic liberation of the decade. An 
additional issue thus relates to the fact that, in most cases, the portrait of a generation is built,  
only a posteriori, upon the memories of the few, and selectively projects certain markers to 
the detriment of others. For example, the importance given to the 1968 student liberation 
movement  (labeled  by  Kriegel  [1978]  as  the  generation  of  1968)  tends  to  overlook  the 
conservatism of the majority, even among the students. We can agree that these events play a 
role beyond the mere labeling of a given epoch and help to construct a shared subjectivity 
(e.g. Domingues 1995), which may be interpreted as an actuality in Mannheim’s definition, 
even though it  takes much more than just a few engaged units to make a generation.
Secondly, it should be acknowledged that units, as opposing terms within the same 
Zeitgeist, are too restricted to narrow ideological and political fields of battle, where small, 
almost  formal,  organized  groups  attempt  to  promote  explicit  political  programs.  The 
narrowness of the concept and the thin parcel of reality covered are important problems when 
we operate with generations. We may recall that the most common labels used to identify 
generations – the post-war generation, the baby-boom generation, the sixties generation, the 
9/11 generation – go far beyond Mannheim’s perspective and are often too broad to take 
account  of  either  the  conflicting  worldviews of  different  units  or  the  whole  generational 
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reality of a larger population. Going back to our critical discussion of generational units, we 
should stress that, if ideological struggles alone are taken as defining events, actualities can 
easily be forgotten or even reduced to their hypothetical or potential generational units, to use 
Mannheim’s terms. In many cases, it is necessary to see how certain groundbreaking events – 
or political  movements catalyzed by these events – provoke the crystallization of already 
existing attitudinal dispositions which tend to last beyond that specific moment in history. Let 
us focus, for instance, on the 1969 Stonewall riots, which many consider the moment that the 
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual/transgender) movement was born (Carter 2004). 
Though an event  such as this  may be transformed into a generational  marker in identity 
construction,  it  not  only  represents  a  historical  moment  of  disruption,  but  also  a  whole 
dynamic process based on what Braudel (1958) calls the ‘longue durée’. Like many other 
events, the Stonewall riots triggered a new societal and cultural dynamic, though it was only 
afterwards that this initial break was reflected in various opposing ideological units and was 
therefore imprinted on the collective memory (Alexander 2004).
The LGBT movement can serve as an example of yet another analytical difficulty. 
Even in strictly political terms, the idea of a unit can be problematic on the level of splitting 
up a social generation, insofar as many of the groups involved are inter-generational. This is 
the case of the LGBT movement,  to mention only this example. In a way, today’s social 
reality may suggest a kind of inversion of Pinder’s principle, on which Mannheim built his 
theory of the stratification of experience, pointing out the importance of the agency of youth. 
We can accept that units are dependent on generational conflict, but this conflict is evident in 
certain  organizational  and  institutional  settings,  rather  than  across  the  board,  in  a  given 
society.  In  this  line  of  reasoning,  there  can  also  be  a  ‘contemporaneity  of  the  non-
contemporaneous’, insofar as individuals of very different ages can be engaged in the same 
political and ideological struggle and thereby share a fairly similar worldview. As many have 
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argued,  in  today’s  world  the  openness  of  modernity  to  the  struggles  for  recognition  and 
redistribution (e.g.  Honneth and Fraser 2003) is a dynamic process stemming from long-
lasting battles and sequences of events, yet it involves people from different age-groups and 
is hardly reducible to the generational opposition between the old and the young. This is so 
even if we can agree that the experience of political  and ideological engagement may be 
marked  by  the  principle  of  the  stratification  of  experience.  The  problem  is  that  this 
stratification of experience underlies the key principle by which a generation is held together. 
For Mannheim, the stratification of the experience of older generations cannot be the same as 
that of younger generations, though they share the same historical environment. It is therefore 
the  sharing  of  the  same formative  years  in  a  given  historical  environment  that  forms  a 
generational consciousness. The transmission of a cultural heritage is always a reflexive and 
interactive process, but, even so, a sense of a common destiny, or a common cause, can only 
arise among those who have lived through the same formative experiences.
In a re-evaluation of Mannheim’s problem of generations, Demartini (1985) presented 
solid arguments on this topic. Countering Mannheim’s view of youth as the leading agent of 
political innovation, the author concluded that political socialization can, in effect, serve as a 
catalyst in tying together different generations. This insightful conclusion led Demartini to 
advocate a revision of the concept of unit insofar as it is unhelpful and misleading in the case 
of any analysis of intergenerational relationships among participants in social and political 
movements.
We may, therefore, argue that the key problem with Mannheim’s view of units as the 
real  generation  stems  from  a  poor  conceptualization  of  agency,  where  only  intellectual 
knowledge allows for individuality: that is, agency. It is necessary, then, to build the analysis 
upon  a  more  complex  version  of  agency,  one  that  neither  falls  into  agencialism  nor 
structuralism; nor, again, into an intellectual-centric fallacy whereby only intellectuals are 
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capable of liberating thinking (e.g. Bourdieu 1997). The concept of actuality is, in this line of 
reasoning, much more operative and should not be discarded, all the more so because there 
can be no locations without actualities, according to our argument. At least,  that is, when 
mobilizing  a  perspective  on  structure  and  agency  that  attempts  to  avoid  the  classical 
dichotomy still pervading generational analysis. 
Of course, this is not a new issue. A number of authors and sociological theorizations 
have tackled the problem, though from different perspectives. But all of them – among which 
we will concentrate on three of the most important – have intended to bring wider forms of 
agency back into the approach to generations.
A very significant contribution is, of course, life course theory. From this perspective, 
historical changes can also be displayed from a biographical standpoint, which allows us to 
recognize  the  generational  location  as  a  regularity,  in  addition  to  the  singularities  that, 
alongside class or gender, produce intra-generational differences. In a way, one of the weak 
points  in  Mannheim’s  theorization  lies  in  the lack of  a  conceptualization  of  biographical 
events as other major motors of change, as the vast bibliography on the issue of biographical 
analysis  has  demonstrated.  In  the  life  course  perspective,  time  is  considered  from three 
analytical angles: first, the historical time of generations as a structural location; second, the 
biographical singularity of every individual’s trajectory; third, the links between lives, with 
an examination of the ways in which different individual biographies are interconnected and 
influence  each  other  (Heinz  and  Kruger  2001,  Elder,  Johnson  and  Crosnoe  2003).  This 
approach allows us to  draw on the real  lives  of  individuals  and,  in  this  way,  grasp how 
different  patterns  of  agency  and  meaning  may  emerge  in  a  specific  generation  without 
necessarily corresponding to or being led by diverse generation units operating in a number 
of institutional fields.
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A second  approach  to  the  problem  of  agency  can  be  found  in  Corsten’s  (1999) 
proposal, which emphasizes the importance of discourses for generation formation. From his 
perspective,  firmly based on the cultural  and discursive turn in the social  sciences, direct 
interaction  is  not  the  most  relevant  element  in  the  dynamics  of  generations.  The  main 
question is rather one of accessing a generation’s socio-cognitive background as a result of 
the  complex  intermingling  of  times  (biographical,  historical,  and  generational),  which 
produces specific generational semantics in certain social circles and networks.
Yet another central contribution to this debate can be found in Eyerman and Turner’s 
(1998)  proposal.  The  authors  redefine  Mannheim’s  original  definition  by  means  of 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1980), in order to facilitate the comparative study of 
generations. In this sense, a generation is a cohort of persons who share a common habitus, 
hexis  and culture.  This  is  particularly  activated  in  specific  and competitive  social  fields, 
where younger generations must compete with older ones for scarce resources (ranging from 
the material to the symbolic), which are generally in the hands of the latter group. But even in 
the wider social space, alongside other structural differentiation processes such as class and 
gender,  these  phenomena  occur,  and  tend  to  provide  generations  –  Eyerman  and Turner 
rightly contend – with a collective memory that not only gives them identity, but also serves 
as an integrating factor that reinforces that identity over time. 
3.3. The problem of agents
The more  complex visions  of  agency briefly  described above allow us  to  rethink 
generations and generational agents far beyond the category of youth. For Mannheim, this 
category was almost the sole bearer of change on account of the importance granted to the 
stratification  of  experience,  in  which  the  formative  years  represented  the  acme  of 
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socialization. As a result, only youth could really embody the essence of a potentially new 
Zeitgeist.
We do not deny that youth and the entry into adulthood are key stages in life and key 
moments of transition in which central models of agency are formed, thereby representing a 
privileged set for observing the interplay of different analytical times (historical, relational, 
individual).  As many have argued since Mannheim (1943) and Parsons (1942 and [1963] 
1999),  the  move  from  adolescence  to  adulthood,  even  if  increasingly  mediated  by  the 
prolonged life stage of youth, is a compelling factor in defining more stable behavioral and 
identity schemes. Class position and gender identity, to mention two of the main structural 
coordinates,  also  tend  to  acquire  more  stable  features  in  accordance  with  a  process  of 
crystallization  that  is  also  performatively  and  normatively  inscribed  in  the  self.  Most 
importantly, following Eyerman and Turner’s (1998) redefinition of Mannheim’s concept of 
generations on the basis of Bourdieu’s habitus, the transition to adulthood tends to function as 
a dispositional stabilizer in the course of the individual life span. This clearly does not mean 
that the transition to adulthood exhausts the potential for change in the structural locations of 
individuals,  or  in  their  subjectivities,  whether  we  speak  of  a  generation  as  an  actuality 
(Mannheim  [1927]  1952),  of  gender  dispositions  (West  and  Zimmerman  1987)  or  of 
adulthood models (Pilcher 1994).
However,  in  accentuating  the  role  of  historical  disruption  in  the  formation  of 
generations, Mannheim ultimately gives excessive importance to youth responses, as if the 
youth, or even a small part of it, were the only actor exercising agency.
The emphasis on youth is still well reflected in contemporary debates but the problem 
of  youth is  certainly  not  new. In 1943,  Mannheim wrote about  the  problem of  youth in 
modern societies, expressing his concern with the role of young people as a motor for social 
change. As he noted (Mannheim 1943, p. 33), ‘in contrast to these static or slowly changing 
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societies, the dynamic societies which want to make a new start,  whatever their social or 
political philosophy may be, will rely mainly upon the cooperation of youth’. On the other 
hand, from a functionalist standpoint, youth was also a concern of Parsons ([1963] 1999), 
who reasoned about youth cultures and the integration of the youth in post-war American 
society. Similarly, Eisenstadt (1956) described the very process through which youth emerged 
as a life-stage and a culture, alongside the decline of traditional kinship systems. Whether the 
focus  is  on  change  or  integration,  youth  has  progressively  become,  to  the  present  day, 
flourishing subject matter for analysis.
Mannheim’s pioneering emphasis raises a few critical problems, though he was well 
aware  of  the  growing  complexification  of  social  processes  and  forms  of  self-reflexivity, 
resulting,  in  modernity,  from  the  differentiation  of  social  communities.  As  he  notes 
(Mannheim [1930] 2001, p. 4), it was important to capture the differences 
between  traditional,  primitive  societies,  where  meanings  were  less 
ambiguous, and modern societies, where ambiguity evolves and allows an 
opening-up to the ideal of self-transformation.
We can start by arguing that Mannheim’s vision of socialization was far too simplistic 
(as demonstrated by life course theory, for instance), as if there were a thick barrier between 
primary and secondary socialization (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966). In contrast, recent 
contributions, such as that of Lahire (2010) in discussing Bourdieu, have quite rightly argued 
in favor of plurality and the continuous impact of life experiences on the re-forming of an 
individual’s  habitus.  At  any  moment,  new  dispositions  may  arise  from  the  continuous 
embodiment  of  new  formative  experiences,  which  can  indeed  lead  individuals  to  make 
changes in their lives, selves and identities. From yet another viewpoint, the emphasis on the 
importance  of  events  and  sequences  of  events  over  time  has  stressed  the  vital  role  of 
biographical analysis (Abbott 2001) if we really want to achieve a thorough examination of 
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the time dimension inherent to societal processes. Restricting the analytical focus to early life 
socialization,  though  relatively  important,  might  also  obfuscate  the  weight  of  later 
experiences  in  the  formation  of  both  worldviews  and the  potential  agency that  they  can 
trigger.
Secondly, we must also say that Mannheim’s approach still contains a fairly linear 
view of the life cycle, which we can also find in a few of his contemporary analysts. In spite 
of  the  fact  that  a  growing  role  is  granted  to  the  idea  of  age-related  flexibilization  and 
pluralization, the seeds of reification remain a serious problem, which led Bourdieu (1990) to 
state that ‘youth is just a word’, that is to say, a constructed and institutionalized category that 
often conceals the diversity existing within it.  If the notion of youth,  along with all age-
categories, has changed over time (a person of 30 was almost on the threshold of middle age 
in  1900),  in today’s  western societies this  is  an even more challenging issue,  as  there is 
visible erosion of the previously more linear frontiers between the different stages of the life 
cycle, as has been pointed out so well by life course theorists. 
In fact, one of the central processes of contemporary societies has been the growing 
flexibilization of individual biographies and identities, a topic that has pushed the discussion 
on time, generations and social  change to the front line of theoretical developments.  The 
transition from a phase of ‘organized modernity’, as Peter Wagner (1994) calls it, to a new 
period  marked by the  detraditionalization (Heelas  1996) of  the old linear  life  cycles  has 
undoubtedly  nourished  the  debate  around  the  pluralization  of  present-day  life  courses 
(Giddens  1991,  Beck  and  Beck-Gernsheim  2002,  Bauman  2001).  The  strongly 
institutionalized  life-course  regimes  prevailing  under  industrialized  modernity  (Hareven 
1982), which were closely linked with almost predetermined identities, have given way to the 
growing individualization of life paths.10 This forces individuals, to an ever greater extent, to 
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face  challenges  related  to  the  construction  of  malleable  and  plural  life  courses,  often 
organized in the form of ‘patchwork biographies’ (Beck 2000, p. 170) and plural selves.
In this line of reasoning, although youth has not surrendered any of its center-stage 
role  as  a  specific  age-group,  which,  for  many  reasons,  remains  of  major  importance  in 
defining new forms of agency, a growing number of authors have called our attention to the 
fluidization of generational identities as a result of the ‘postmodernization of culture’ (e.g. 
Eyerman and Turner 1998). In spite of the institutional codification of age in present-day 
societies (Kohli 2007), being young and being old have also become more individualized 
categories of belonging, often performed through a self-presentation that masks biological 
age through fashion and beauty treatments, a certain body hexis, and consumer habits and life 
styles (Featherstone 1991). As plurality itself has developed into a dominant norm (see note 
3),  almost  hegemonic  in  the  Durkheimian  sense,  the  construction  of  the  self  and  the 
acceptance of the other as different cannot be linear endeavors, but must rather be the subject 
of a certain plasticity and even normative confusion. The rising number of terms to handle the 
plurality of the self makes our point quite evident, as initially stated. Even within a structural 
system, as Lévi-Strauss (1966) noted, individuals are ‘bricoleurs’. They mix references with a 
certain  freedom,  thus  creating  a  correlated  degree  of  fuzziness.  Even  more  so,  we  add, 
because  the  fluidization  of  generational  identities  implies  not  only  the  blurring  of  age 
differences, but also the fact that these differences are often attributed the same cultural and 
normative value. If, for the past, generational identities – at least to a certain extent – could 
more easily be portrayed as virtually monolithic or simply fragmented along clear-cut lines of 
differentiation (class, gender, ethnicity), the younger generation tends to be presented these 
days  as  the  bearer  of  an  explosion  of  references  that  cannot  be  compared to  the  simple 
dividing lines of earlier historical periods, complex though they may have been (as Eisenstadt 
[1956] had already pointed out).
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Therefore, in accordance with the idea that in modernity an ongoing transition from 
more simple to more complex identities is taking place (as a result of social differentiation 
and individualization processes),  how can we explain the expanding diversity  of models, 
norms and life courses not only among younger people but also within other age groups that 
should not be neglected, and at the same time prove the importance of studying the young as 
the carriers of specific youth cultures in contrast to former generations? The task that this 
apparently simple question involves is by no means easy. It demands a subsequent but central 
question: can we speak of young people as a generation marked by a number of historical and 
cultural commonalities? Mannheim’s answer presupposes, quite obviously, the emergence of 
a  common  consciousness.  Our  own  must  necessarily  bring  a  broader  perspective  of 
worldviews and agency into play, but let us, for now, address the last major critical issue in 
Mannheim’s  approach:  the  problem  of  consciousness. As  we  will  argue,  even  though 
Mannheim rejected Marxist views, the problem of how a generation – or younger generation 
units,  to  be  more  precise  –  can  form a  consciousness  poses  similar  difficulties  to  those 
inherent to the process of the transformation of a class in itself to a class for itself.
3.4. The problem of consciousness
As we know, Mannheim conceptualized generations as communities linked to history. 
In  this  sense,  generations  –  as  locations  –  presented  an  alternative  to  Marx’s  historical 
materialism,  even  if  Mannheim’s  approach  can  be  considered  as  profoundly  indebted  to 
Marx. In effect, a generation as a historical location is quite analogical to a class location and, 
as  in  Marx,  it  presupposes,  as  a  pre-condition  for  social  change to  take place,  the  same 
passage from a class (a generation) in itself to a class (a generation) for itself (Domingues 
1995).  Although the author was rather critical  of the Marxist  legacy and attached greater 
value to culture and its plurality of ideologies (Kettler et al. 2008), generations, like social 
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classes, may form units organized through the sharing not only of common experiences, but 
also, most importantly, a common reflexivity. In fact, in Mannheim’s theorization, collective 
or  generational  unity  was  the  last  phase in  a  process  in  which  individual  and collective 
biographies interacted within a common historical context (Mannheim [1927] 1952, p. 291) 
However, differently from Marx, for Mannheim, a generation can then be constituted by very 
different ‘generation units’, in accordance with their particular experience of historical time 
and, most of all, due to the diverse forms of generational awareness (Mannheim [1927] 1952, 
p. 304). The realization of a generation through a number of units is produced above all by 
the consciousness of its members. However, in most cases, individuals are not completely 
aware of their generational inclusion: they are simply a generation in itself that fails to fulfill 
its potential for historical agency. For Mannheim, in this matter, generation is quite similar to 
social class. Individuals share similar life conditions, from a structural standpoint, though a 
generation and Marx’s class point to different kinds of social locations and different forms of 
envisaging both the formation of consciousness and the ways in which a person moves from 
awareness to action and a political and ideological struggle.
Although deeply concerned with ideology, a concept that he borrows from Marx and 
attempts to revise, and the affinities between this and social group locations – in this case, 
generations – Mannheim diverges from Marx in two important aspects, which it is important 
to highlight (Kettler et al. 2008, p. 5). The first (and almost obvious) difference is that, under 
the influence of Max Weber’s ([1924] 1946) work, Mannheim foresees locations other than 
class  as  fertile  ground  for  ideologies  to  flourish.  Furthermore,  ideologies  do  not  cover 
economic interests alone, as Marx claimed, but are rather the expression of multiple opposing 
standpoints in relation to the world, originating from different, though more complex, social 
locations. Alongside class, generation and even gender are a key element in the processes 
through  which  struggles  for  power  may  be  understood.  Secondly,  and  perhaps  more 
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importantly,  Mannheim rejects  the historical  determinism proposed by Marx and Lukács, 
where class consciousness is linked to its teleological destiny in shaping history itself. In fact, 
Mannheim clearly rejects the idea of a strict causal link between a certain location and a 
certain worldview. On the contrary, he argues in favor of a wider range of possibilities for 
meaning to emerge, considering that individuals with a similar location may in fact have quite 
different visions of their  own time and space, even if there is a demonstrable connection 
between  material  locations  and  cultural  views  (Mannheim ([1929]  1936).  All  in  all,  for 
Mannheim,  social  change  still  depends  on  conflict,  but  conflict  is,  rather,  a  cultural 
phenomenon. This claim is closely related to his insistence on rejecting the Enlightenment 
idea  of  a  foundational  truth  in  favor  of  a  linguistically  structured  life-world,  which  can 
contain and promote different worldviews, that is, different ‘truths’. This premise led many to 
accuse  Mannheim  of  relativism  and  misguided  utopianism  in  his  conceptualization  of 
ideology and political practice (e.g.  Horkheimer [1930] 1995, Lukács [1954] 1981,  Adorno 
[1955] 1983).
However, returning to our main contention in this section, we must say that the solid 
argument in favor of consciousness and the role of intellectuals in social processes as the 
main holders of knowledge betrays Mannheim’s inability to overcome some of Marxism’s 
central tenets, particularly the duality attributed to consciousness. Furthermore, the emphasis 
on young intellectuals clearly points to the prevalence of the notion of the  intelligentzia in 
Mannheim: to a great extent, only engaged intellectual social groups fulfill the potential for 
social transformation inherent to a specific generation location. In a way, this notion brings 
Mannheim close to Gramsci in the latter’s project to award culture and ideology a key role,11 
even if Mannheim’s intellectuals are of a different nature from those envisaged by Gramsci 
([1947] 1979) as ‘organic intellectuals’, as Norberto Bobbio (2001) notably recognizes. For 
Gramsci, these collective intellectuals are directly linked to the party, while, in Mannheim’s 
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view, intellectuals are detached from direct political struggle. Instead, their main role is to 
interpret contradictory positions and supply a modern scheme for decoding the ideologies 
resulting  from  particular  locations  in  the  time-space  continuum. Nonetheless,  the  key 
function of ideology and intellectuals in Mannheim’s theoretical edifice deserves attention, if 
we really want to revise the concept of a social generation.  For the role of intellectuals is 
absolutely central to Mannheim’s reasoning, even if, as Kettler et al. (2008, p. 2) state, ‘A 
central feature of Karl Mannheim’s analysis of modern intellectuals is the recognition of their 
versatility’. In books such as  Ideology and Utopia and  Essays on the Sociology of Culture 
this aspect was quite clear, though it still raises a few important problems.
Indeed,  the  figure  of  the  intellectual  symbolized  Mannheim’s  effort  to  achieve  a 
synthesis  between  different  forms  of  thought  (from  Marx  and  Weber  to  American 
Pragmatism),  as  he  moved  away  from  materialistic  determinism.  The  independence  of 
intellectuals from class interests, or other constraints to free thinking, was thus central to the 
author’s analysis, though a certain importance was granted to historical locations. Refusing 
the Hegelian idealist tradition, Mannheim considered that an analysis of the history of ideas 
should be tied together with history itself. As a consequence, the production of knowledge is 
not an independent enterprise. However, under the conditions of modernity, as Mannheim 
(1956) also noted, the production of knowledge is an increasingly conscious process. As he 
claims, the times were of conscious self-existence. In his own words (Mannheim 1956, p. 
96): ‘Our age is characterized not only by a growing self-awareness but also by our capacity 
to determine the concrete nature of this consciousness: we live in a time of conscious social  
existence.’ In this line of reasoning, intellectuals were the main source of a new possibility for 
independent and critical knowledge to emerge in a world facing an ideological crisis.
However,  for  Mannheim,  it  was  precisely  that  time  of  crisis  that  promoted  the 
proliferation of ideologies and made it impossible to connect them to a single source, location 
36
or theoretical tradition, as in Marx’s theory of historical materialism. He wanted to recognize 
the relativistic character of all worldviews in order to transcend them. As he says (Mannheim 
1956,  p.  20):  ‘Inasmuch  as  society  is  the  common  frame  of  interaction,  ideation,  and 
communication, the sociology of the mind is the study of mental functions in the context of 
action. It is from this approach that we must expect one of the possible answers to the needed 
synthesis.’
This synthesis was the task of intellectuals. In his Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
Mannheim seeks to provide a typology of the intelligentzia within the dynamics of history. In 
those modern times there was a new role and a new meaning for the  intelligentzia as the 
result of a qualitative leap in the form itself of the intelligentzia. The combination of the free 
market  and  a  new  system  of  education  would  allow  new  intellectuals  to  emerge.  The 
Mannheimian notion of  intelligentzia is indebted to Alfred Weber’s concept of ‘relatively 
uncommitted  intelligentzia’ (relativ freischwebende Intelligenz) (Mannheim 1956, p. 106). 
As  Mannheim  (1956,  p.  106)  wrote,  ‘The  epithet  “relative”  was  no  empty  word.  The 
expression simply alluded to the well-established fact that intellectuals do not react to given 
issues as cohesively as for example employees and workers do. Even these show, from case 
to  case,  variations  in  their  responses  to  given issues;  still  more  do  the  so-called  middle 
classes, and least uniform is the political behaviour of the intelligentsia.’
However,  the  idea  of  the  uncommitted  intellectual  does  not  completely  exclude 
interests, such as those of a class. In modern societies the fact that intellectuals are recruited 
from different social classes puts them in a particular (and privileged) position. So a new 
class  or  group  emerges,  detached  from  economic  processes.  For  this  reason,  modern 
intellectuals, as the repositories of knowledge, are quite a heterogeneous group, guided by a 
sense of modern individualism and autonomous judgment. The configuration of the modern 
intelligentzia reflects  political  direction  and  action,  where  values  still  play  a  key  role. 
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Nevertheless, even if intellectuals advance and debate their particular views of the world, 
thus revealing their class engagement, they do it from another platform, where the individual 
will  is  more  important.  The  task  placed  upon  their  shoulders  is  by  no  means  easy,  as 
Mannheim himself recognizes. As he wrote (Mannheim 1956, p. 92), ‘But as he ventures 
beyond the area of an established world-view he faces at each turn the perennial problem: 
how  can  he  who  knows  about  his  own  conditional  existence  reach  and  carry  out 
unconditional  decisions?’  It  was  precisely  this  extreme  and  necessarily  clairvoyant 
detachment of the intellectual that led Horkheimer ([1930] 1995, p. 141) to accuse Mannheim 
of interpreting all intellectual standpoints ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ (made from the perspective 
of the eternal), on the way to the attainment of eternal truth. Horkheimer claims, then, that, by 
succumbing to a metaphysical view of the intelligentzia, Mannheim ends up by reproducing a 
great deal of the  Enlightenment’s conception of a universal truth, which he fought to leave 
behind. Free-floating intellectuals are in a way quite a Utopian idea, which hardly fits social 
reality  (Woldring  1986).  It  was,  however,  these  intellectuals  who  best  represented  what 
Mannheim considered a real generation.
For a number of reasons, among which the one mentioned above is of the utmost 
importance, Mannheim’s approach to generations is not enough to disentangle contemporary 
processes related to age and social change. On the one hand, he is too strongly attached to a  
number of key tenets in Marx’s analysis of social classes, which cannot be transposed into 
generational  analysis.  A  generation  cannot  be  reduced  to  units  commanded  by  free 
intellectuals,  plural  though  they  may  be.  Even  on  the  basis  of  such  a  perspective  the 
connections  between  intellectuals  and  their  worldviews  should  be  complexified,  namely 
through  an  analysis  that  includes  power  and  ideological  domination,  and  therefore  the 
production of non-coercive hegemony, now in the Gramscian sense, as the main dimensions 
of the cultural production of generational identities.
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However, that is not the object of this text. Much more important, in our view, is to 
argue  for  an enlarged notion  of  generation,  and thus  seek  to  overcome one of  the  main 
operative problems in the field. If, as we consider, it is important to start with Mannheim, it  
must  be  acknowledged  that,  though  a  culturalist,  he  does  not  go  beyond  either  a  strict 
structural level of the analysis or voluntaristic forms of conscious agency, particularly that of 
politically engaged youth groups. Having said that, we should add that this ideal hardly fits 
the role of youth groups in present-day societies. This role has not only become wider in its  
reach – a good example is the use of Mannheim’s approach in order to disentangle the role 
played,  for  instance,  by  artistic  groups,  namely  those  aiming  at  political  criticism  and 
intervention12 –  but also fuzzier in its frontiers both in time and space, as the processes of 
globalization  (and  its  technological  devices,  such  as  the  internet  or  mass-media)  lead 
researchers to think of global generations (e.g. Edmunds and Turner 2005).
Discussion and conclusion
Our  main  aim  in  this  article  was  to  critically  reassess  Mannheim’s  theory  of 
generations, in order to develop some of the potentially productive analytical paths that might 
help us to further the construction of a generational perspective that could operate with larger 
parcels  of  the  population  and  in  other  fields  than  the  political  and  the  intellectual.  We 
recognize Mannheim’s inescapable and foundational contribution, as well as the centrality of 
a wider generational analysis. As we have argued, despite the many difficulties inherent to the 
concept, generation cannot be reduced to other conceptual substitutes, such as cohort, age-
group or genealogical generation. As a result, there is an increasing need to overcome the 
limitations and theoretical ‘dead-ends’ in Mannheim’s work. Even more so because a great 
part of the research done using his conceptual framework does in fact aim at and generate 
types of generational phenomena well beyond the scope of his reasoning. The proliferation of 
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generational  labels  such as  the  ‘baby boom generation’,  ‘sixties  generation’,  ‘Woodstock 
generation’ or ‘millennium generation’ are just a few examples of this trend.
We have discussed four of the main points of criticism regarding Mannheim’s theory: 
time, agency, agents and consciousness. In this final section, we would like to go back to the 
problem  of  time,  which,  in  our  view,  is  perhaps  the  most  fundamental  problem  to  be 
addressed.  In  reviewing  his  conceptualization  of  time,  which  results  in  a  complex  and 
ambiguous duality between external and internal time, as well as his subsequent emphasis on 
internal time (from which the free-floating intellectual emerges, with all the consequences 
discussed above), we believe that, to a great extent, all the other issues are brought into play. 
Our claim is based on the fact that this duality reproduces the classical dichotomy between 
structure and agency. Once again, the problem recaptures the unending fracture within the 
social sciences.
It  is  necessary to adopt a theoretical framework that does not set the internal and 
external in opposition. It should be in line with both the contributions of Pierre Bourdieu (as 
Eyerman and Turner [1998] have argued) and their complexification as developed by Lahire 
(2010). It should also be coupled with the intricacies uncovered by life course perspectives on 
the relationship between biographies and historical dynamics. If generations often blend into 
each other diffusely, then we have to observe not only the continual historical change (in its  
disruptions or continuities, and even more importantly its gradualisms) but also the subtle and 
complex alterations of generational habitus. A generation is not created by an event, but by 
multiple series of entangled events, that is, a historical dynamic. It is this historical dynamic 
and its embodiment and transformation through agency that makes a generation much more 
than a cohort. This approach does not fall into externalism, we believe, on account of a non-
reductionist  and  non-dichotomical  conceptualization  of  the  structure-agency  relationship, 
even though it may prove a difficult operational endeavor to identify empirical generations. It 
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may  be  argued  that  if  historical  disruption  is  not  the  decisive  factor  that  unleashes 
generational difference and self awareness, this will lead to a vision where generations are 
diluted. However, we can object to this reasoning on two fronts.
Firstly, we argue that long-term dynamics have more impact than single disruptive 
events. These are not experienced by everybody in the same manner, and are sometimes quite 
localized:  in certain social  groups and in certain social  fields or institutional settings.  Of 
course, even though some of these events may disrupt other social spaces, even to the point of 
becoming almost across-the-board societal  events, we argue that such ‘events’ are in fact 
processes, though they may be labeled as events that affect collective memory and serve as 
time-markers (even conscious markers of explicit generational differentiation). Nevertheless, 
these ideological labels refer to realities that have sometimes hardly been lived by many. 
Secondly, we do not deny that disruptive processes may accelerate inter-generational 
differentiation. What we argue is that we should not single out certain events to the detriment 
of others, taking the part for the whole, since this selection may either ignore the majority of 
the population or exaggerate the inter-generational difference within a minority. As a result, 
we  argue  that  there  are  always  generational  actualities,  to  use  Mannheim’s  terminology, 
arising from and participating in the dynamics of history, and these actualities are true and 
real generations.
Though, in this perspective, the frontiers between generations may be fuzzy – and 
even difficult to reconstruct, thus mirroring reality, the concept of cohort lacks the essential 
ingredients of agency and culture. If cohorts can always be found and statistically deployed, 
generations are always a social reality, insofar as there are no agents without agency or time 
periods without culture and worldviews, which every individual possesses. It is not only a 
matter of shared collective subjectivities, which were emphasized in the systemic view put 
forward by Domingues (1995) and are of great importance to the formation of collective 
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memories,  but  also a  question  of  focusing on generational  habitus  (linking structure and 
agency) and the impact of biographies on the diversification of generational trajectories and 
identities.
The connection between location and structures of knowledge must be understood in a 
wider sense than that of Mannheim. As for social class, we would not say, at the present stage 
of sociological discussion, that only certain classes or small elites within each class produce 
and  possess  culture.  Likewise,  generations  must  be  approached  in  the  same  manner.  If 
generations are to be understood as central differentiation processes in modern societies there 
can be no individuals without a generation identity or historical periods without generations – 
in the same way as there are no people or time periods without class. All individuals present a 
generational identity linked to culture, which is entangled in the practices that they carry out 
and, as a result, the agency they possess.
If indeed the Mannheimian concept of ideology (Mannheim 1936 [1929]) should be 
reformulated  and  enlarged  in  order  to  account  for  the  complexity  of  the  structures  of 
knowledge, then we must not reduce ideology to an engaged and combatant worldview put 
forward by an elite. If we want to avoid this trap, what Mannheim called ideology must be 
understood, in a broader sense, as culture (Corsten 1999). But, of course, if a generation is 
such a cultural phenomenon, it also depends on the specific ideological context in which it is 
brought into being and on the power conflicts that pervade it, whether these struggles are 
between generations  (for  the appropriation of certain resources,  for instance)  or within a 
generation, where different worldviews collide and concur. These battles, however, are not 
just those of the political units of a generation – or age-group, to be more precise.
In fact, Mannheim’s key concept of unit is excessively narrow. For two main reasons. 
On the one hand, social conflict is not, primarily, generational conflict and cannot be reduced 
to just a few specific areas of social life. Conflict is an all-pervading phenomenon, sometimes 
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generational (inter or intra-generational), though often not. It takes place in a wide array of 
social spaces, not just the political or intellectual fields. On the other hand, even if we take 
the concept of unit as a useful tool in the analysis of individual agency, we believe that it is 
more  operative  to  make  it  less  important  than  the  notion  of  actuality,  thus  inverting 
Mannheim’s hierarchical formulation of the scheme of generations. One important reason that 
might be given for this is, of course, that culture is more diffuse than Mannheim suggested. 
But, more importantly, we need to rethink the role of intra-generational differences and the 
increasing opportunities for individuals to participate in a large array of units, or rather, social 
circles, which are not necessarily generational units or even crystallized ones. Otherwise, the 
idea of a generation unit as defined by Mannheim can erode the notion itself of a generation.
Nevertheless, if units are not always clear-cut, that does not necessarily mean that 
generations need be. As said before, not only may generations often be a fuzzy and imprecise 
reality  but,  most  importantly,  they can  have different  borders,  levels  of  structuration and 
meanings in different social spaces. A generation may be more tangible, in a sense ‘harder’, 
in the political space than, for instance, in the arena of life styles and musical preferences. Or 
the other way around. Such details depend on specific historical dynamics. For a very specific 
and narrow social space, such as contemporary erudite music, particular and singular events 
will have greater impact. Furthermore, generations will tend to be short-lived. Of course, the 
wider the social space, the larger and more complex the social dynamics will be. These can 
be  ‘softer’  generations,  inasmuch  as  they  are  more  open  and  permeable  to  change, 
globalization, or even intergenerational participation. In fact, we must stress that, in our view, 
the wider the social space for generational differentiation, the fuzzier the social generations 
will be. For the whole of the social space (that is, a society or a group of integrated societies),  
generations will necessarily be ‘soft’, at least in most situations, and perhaps increasingly so 
in contemporary times. Generational frontiers between age groups seem to be less categorical 
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with the flow of  modernity.  Generations  will  not  only have internal  differences  (or even 
internal oppositions within a collective communality), but they will also gradually blend into 
one another, in a kind of clinal distribution.
The definition of the concept of generation depends on the analytical object being 
addressed.  For  instance,  inter-generational  differentiation  may  not  be  the  same  (whether 
regarding age differences, or the strength of the differences themselves) if we are dealing 
with artistic styles, political positioning, intimate and family life, values, or even the notions 
of selfhood and identities.
Consequently, we are proposing that generations have different levels of structuration. 
But  not  in  the  sense  Mannheim gave to  the  subject,  with  his  emphasis  on  political  and 
intellectual self-awareness. We apply this idea to the whole of the social space, not only a 
particular field, even though different institutional spheres may produce diverse generational 
differentiations.  We do so on the basis  that historical dynamics will  always translate into 
generational actualities, and that these are carried forward by active social agents within their 
respective structural constraints.
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